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Without Deference
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski*

I. INTRODUCTION
This administrative state is here, and, absent radical and unlikely changes in the scope of federal power, it is not going away. The shape of the administrative state and its distribution of powers, however, may be less inevitable. This Symposium, A Future Without the Administrative State?, is therefore wise to consider the more modest question of whether there are reasonable alternatives to the Chevron doctrine.
The Chevron doctrine requires courts to defer to administrative agencies’ reasonable conclusions on questions of law.1 Even as the case approaches middle age, it remains controversial. Many jurists and scholars see
it as a salutary and natural outgrowth of administrative legal doctrine that
recognizes the necessity of agencies’ technical expertise and political accountability.2 On the other hand, those of a more legalist bent – including
those who accept, embrace, or reject the current scope of the regulatory state
– blanch at the judiciary’s abasement at the feet of administrators: Even if a
dynamic and complex world requires policymaking more nimble than traditional legislatures can provide, it need not follow that challenging legal questions should go from the courts to administrators.3 The prospect of rejecting
Chevron is therefore more plausible than abandoning the administrative state
as we know it. Accordingly, this contribution to the Symposium explores the
implications of the doctrine’s abandonment.
*
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful to Erin Morrow Hawley
and the editors of the Missouri Law Review for the generous invitation to the Symposium and their hospitality. I am also indebted to Amy Barrett, Aditya Bamzai, Jack
Beermann, Ryan Doerfler, Jonah Gelbach, Randy Kozel, Sarah Pojanowski, Adrian
Vermuele, and the Symposium participants and audience for the thoughtful questions
and comments. This Article also benefited from feedback from workshop participants
at George Mason University and the University of Pennsylvania Law Schools. All
errors remain mine.
1. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The
Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 921, 943–44 (2006) (citing scholars who favor Chevron deference because of
agency expertise, political accountability, and Congress’s implicit delegation of power of interpretation to agencies); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 862 (2001) (“[F]ederal statutory programs have
become so complex that it is beyond the capacity of most federal judges to understand
the full ramifications of the narrowly framed interpretational questions that come
before them.”).
3. See infra Part II.
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To make the thought experiment most stark in contrast, I will imagine a
future in which courts undertake de novo review of agency conclusions on
questions of law.4 To be clear, abandoning Chevron is not the same thing as
abolishing deference. Deference of a different kind existed before Chevron,5
and if the Court were to abandon Chevron tomorrow, the Court may revert to
something like that preexisting, milder form of deference.6 Nevertheless,
imagining a regime without any deference clarifies the stakes of reforming
judicial review of agencies’ legal conclusions. Thus, for present purposes,
and present purposes only, I equate abandoning Chevron with abandoning
judicial deference on agencies’ legal interpretations.
I argue that such an alternative regime has appealing features but may
not bring as much practical change as casual critiques or defenses of Chevron
contemplate, at least immediately. The more immediate change would arise
at the level of theory and rhetoric, which, in turn, may lead to greater practical changes in the longer run. The theoretical presuppositions underwriting a
regime of non-deferential review are far more classical in cast than the moderate legal realism underwriting Chevron. Rejecting deference, therefore,
would change how courts talk about the difference between law and policy in
the administrative state. The resurrection of the classical distinction between
interpreting and making law might therefore alter the way courts think about
that relationship. If that is the case, rejecting deference could lead to a more
robust judicial role on close questions of interpretation.
Alternatively, some courts may already be quite aggressive on questions
of interpretation, usually through a vigorous application of Step One. This is
often the case, for example, at the Supreme Court. To the extent this is so,
abandoning deference would bring the courts’ skeptical rhetoric about the
law/policy divide in line with their practice on the ground. This would reveal
that interpreters are less skeptical about the line between law and policy than
their rhetoric suggests. In short, it would show we are not, in fact, all legal
realists now, at least with respect to problems amenable to the lawyers’ traditional toolkit. Either way, the more traditional character of the theoretical
orientation underwriting the case against deference may also shed light on the
rise and (partial) fall of Chevron in administrative legal thought.

II. CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Judicial review of agencies’ legal conclusions is one of the most vexing
questions in administrative law. At the center of that storm is the Supreme
4. It may be that this less-deferential future is impossible, or impossible to sustain. For an argument that the logic of administrative law leads to an eternal return to
judicial deference to agencies, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM
LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016).
5. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
6. For such a proposal, see Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42
CONN. L. REV. 779, 845–50 (2010).
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Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.7 In Chevron, the Court offered a now-famous two-step process
for reviewing agency conclusions of law.8 First, the reviewing court uses the
ordinary tools of statutory construction to determine on a de novo basis
whether Congress has spoken clearly to the question at issue.9 If the court
finds a clear answer to the question, that interpretation governs, irrespective
of the agency’s judgment.10 If, however, the statute is unclear, the reviewing
court must defer to an agency’s interpretation that is reasonable, even if the
court would have arrived at a different interpretation on its own.11
The Chevron framework offers numerous puzzles: How clear is “clear”
at Step One?12 What tools of interpretation should a court use to find clarity?13 What does it mean for an interpretation to be “reasonable” at Step
Two?14 How many steps does the Chevron two-step actually have?15 To
what kinds of legal interpretations does Chevron apply?16 What standard of
review applies when Chevron is not in play?17 Should an agency get strong
deference when it reverses its interpretation?18 The Court’s subsequent elaborations and applications of the doctrine only add further complexity.19 Thus,
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842.
Id. at 842–43, 843 n.9.
Id. at 842–43.
Id. at 843–44.
See, e.g., Note, “How Clear is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1687 (2005).
13. Compare, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81,
105–06 (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding agency’s interpretation clearly supported by
legislative history), with id. at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (withholding Chevron deference because the text clearly contradicted the agency’s interpretation).
14. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of
Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313 (1996) [hereinafter
Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process] (exploring the different ways of understanding reasonableness).
15. Compare Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only
One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009), with Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss,
Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009).
16. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 2; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero].
17. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–39 (2001) (holding that
the less-deferential standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), applies
when Chevron does not); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that the
standard of review in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945),
applies to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations).
18. See Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59
UCLA L. REV. 112 (2011) [hereinafter Kozel & Pojanowski, Administrative Change]
(examining this question).
19. For an argument to this effect, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has
Muddied Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005). Confu-
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Chevron is the case that launched a thousand scholarly ships. Increasingly,
however, judges and academics have raised more fundamental questions
about whether Chevron deference should exist at all.
Skepticism about Chevron deference is not new,20 but hostile rumblings
from the Supreme Court have grown in the past few Terms. Leading the
charge is Justice Clarence Thomas, who last year questioned Chevron’s constitutionality.21 But he is no lone voice in the wilderness. Chief Justice Roberts voiced discomfort with judicial abnegation to an ever-growing administrative apparatus. Although his complaints about deference running amok
went unheeded in City of Arlington v. FCC,22 he soon thereafter led a majority in King v. Burwell that withheld deference on questions of “deep ‘economic and political significance.’”23 In his final Terms on the Court, Justice Scalia’s applications of Step Two could be so aggressive that one suspected his
prior ardor for Chevron had begun to cool.24 One such opinion, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas, led one scholar to
opine that Justice Scalia “may no longer be satisfied by any reasonable agency reading of ambiguous statutory language.”25 Finally, Justice Breyer’s
sion in the wake of the Court’s recent decision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,
136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016), is but a recent example. Compare Adrian Vermeule, Encino
is Banal, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 23, 2016),
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/encino-is-banal-by-adrian-vermeule/, with Michael
Pollack & Daniel Hemel, Chevron Step 0.5, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(June 24, 2016), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/chevron-step-0-5-by-michael-pollackand-daniel-hemel.
20. See generally Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
21. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). For a recent, fulsome critique of Chevron deference by a prominent appellate
judge, see Gutierrez-Brizulea v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150–54 (2016) (raising concerns about Chevron and
suggesting limitations to the doctrine) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING
STATUTES (2014)).
22. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–79 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
23. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
24. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707–10; Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at
2443–44; see also Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead, Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1867, 1869 (2015) (noting Justice Scalia’s rhetorical lukewarmness toward
Chevron in Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). Justice Scalia also called on the Court to abandon deference to agency
interpretations of their own regulations. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that the deference to
agency interpretations of regulations raises constitutional concerns); id. at 1210–11
(Alito, J., concurring) (raising but not resolving doubts about such deference).
25. Amanda C. Leiter, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA: A Shot Across the
Bow of the Administrative State, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 79 (2014).
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contextual, multifactor approach to Chevron in majority opinions like Barnhart v. Walton, as well as in separate opinions, suggest a return to deference
doctrine in line with the more searching pre-Chevron regime.26
Scholarly voices have joined the skeptical chorus as well. Professor
Philip Hamburger describes Chevron as “notorious” and argues that deference is an “abandonment of judicial office” that unconstitutionally biases
adjudication in favor of the government.27 Professor Jack Beermann, who is
far less hostile to the regulatory state than Hamburger, has nailed to the door
of administrative orthodoxy ten theses in support of overruling Chevron.28
Professor Aditya Bamzai offers a new, historically-grounded argument
against Chevron’s legal foundations.29 And, more modestly, Professor Michael Herz argues that, while the strong form of Chevron envisioned by its
champions is dead, a kinder, gentler style of Chevron reigns supreme.30
Notwithstanding its importance, Chevron is unlikely a “super precedent”
categorically protected from revision.31 Still, it is not easy to count to five
votes on the Court for deference skepticism, and it is rash to conclude that a
few highly salient opinions capture a deeper trend. The most likely impact of
the boomlet of Chevron dissensus is the preservation and proliferation of
doctrinal safety valves courts can use to domesticate deference. Professor
Herz claims, plausibly, that this is precisely where we have arrived.32 But
imagining alternative doctrinal futures is one of the tasks and luxuries of
scholarship, and this Article asks what administrative law would look like if
the courts explicitly disavowed deference to agency interpretations of law. If
that vision is both appealing and practically workable, further pressing the
envelope against deference seems worthwhile. If the cure is worse than the

26. See 535 U.S. 212, 217–20 (2002); City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875
(Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that “ambiguity is a sign – but not always a conclusive sign – that Congress intends” deference).
27. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 46, 316 (2014)
[hereinafter HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL]; Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1249 (2016) [hereinafter Hamburger, Chevron Bias].
28. See Beermann, supra note 6, at 782–83 (“Chevron should be overruled for
the following overlapping sets of [ten] reasons: . . . .”).
29. See Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive InterpreL.J.
(forthcoming
2017),
tation,
126
YALE
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2649445; see also Aditya Bamzai, Marbury v. Madison and the Concept of Judicial Deference, 81 MO. L. REV.
1057, 1065 (2016) (arguing that “Marbury does involve a form of ‘deference’ to executive interpretation of statutory text, but the executive interpretation mattered because it was evidence of a customary practice under the statutory scheme”).
30. See generally Herz, supra note 24.
31. See Beermann, supra note 6, at 841–43 (arguing that overruling Chevron
satisfies the criteria for departing from stare decisis). But see Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1325 (2008) (stating that “the decision’s
pluralist vision sets it apart as a distinctly postmodern super-precedent”).
32. See Herz, supra note 24, at 1870.
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disease, however, perhaps, in the words of Professor Gary Lawson, we
“should just shut up about Chevron.”33

III. CONTINUITY
Before discussing what about administrative law would change should
the Court trade Chevron deference for de novo review of legal questions, we
should first identify what would likely stay the same. Abandoning Chevron
may not, in fact, change the frequency and extent of judicial deference as
much as Chevron’s critics hope or its supporters fear.
First, and most obviously, review of legal interpretations that are not eligible for Chevron deference today would remain the same. Whether it is
because the agency does not administer the statute in question or because its
interpretation fails to get deference under Mead’s multifactor test, many
agency interpretations of statutes already receive de novo or less deferential
review under Skidmore’s standard.34
Second, and more importantly, the impact of abandoning Chevron depends on how rigorously courts apply Step One today. Often, courts will use
all the usual interpretive tools at their disposal and consider not only the provision at issue, but also the broader text and structure of the act and perhaps
even other related or similar legislation.35 Once a judge completes such a
searching review and reaches a firm conclusion that one interpretation is
stronger than other plausible ones, it may be hard to walk back and defer to
an agency reading that is colorable but not “the best.” Indeed, interpretations
that first appeared plausible may come to seem deeply flawed after a thoroughgoing inquiry. At that point, deference kicks in only when the judge is
nearly at a loss about which of the competing interpretations is best. Practically, if not theoretically, such a rigorous inquiry would make Chevron “a
doctrine of desperation,” in the words of Justice Scalia.36
Of course Justice Scalia, while a tireless advocate for the broad application of Chevron doctrine, would be rigorous in his review of agency interpretations.37 This is not paradoxical, as he himself once explained. When one,
33. Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on
Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1377, 1384 (1997) [hereinafter Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion].
34. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (laying out the multifactor test).
35. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133
(2000), superseded by statute, Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act,
21 U.S.C.A. §§ 387–387u (West 2016).
36. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
37. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707–10 (2015); Util. Air
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442–44 (2014); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v.
Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 109–12 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1015–20 (2005) (Scalia,
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like Justice Scalia, is more likely to find “that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,” that interpreter
“thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.”38 If standard deference practice within Chevron’s domain is
closer to Justice Scalia’s approach, the set of cases that would come out differently after Chevron shrinks accordingly.
The strength of Step One, and its consequent effect on the stakes of a
deference regime, is an empirical question and one that might be impossible
to answer with certainty. Recent research by Professors Kent Barnett and
Christopher Walker indicates that the courts of appeals are more deferential
than the Supreme Court.39 If so, a Supreme Court instruction to abandon
deference could have a significant impact at the court of appeals level. In
fact, the impression that abandoning Chevron would make little difference
might be a product of excessive focus on the Supreme Court’s practice. The
courts of appeals, by contrast, may not have the institutional capacity or interest in following an instruction to abandon deference. Lacking the Supreme
Court’s luxurious docket, staffing, and sense of interpretive confidence, informal deference would be more likely to sneak in at the courts of appeals, at
least in close or complicated cases. This does not mean interpretive regime
change would have no effect at the courts of appeals; a panel with the taste
and time for rigorous review could do so in the open and with the encouragement of blackletter doctrine. Whether for theoretical or practical reasons,
however, there are reasons to believe that abandoning Chevron may have a
smaller impact than a textbook acquaintance with the doctrine suggests.

IV. PRACTICAL CHANGES
Irrespective of the intensity with which courts assess the reasonableness
of agency interpretations, jettisoning Chevron would simplify litigation. The
import of one certain, new complication – disuniformity in regulatory regimes – would depend on how rigorous courts are today in applying Chevron.
First, the simplifications. By abandoning deference, the Court would
eliminate a wide swath of satellite litigation Chevron spawns in its current
form – and the closer the Court moves to de novo review of legal questions,
the more collateral questions it sloughs off. Foremost, there would be no
disputation about whether Chevron applies. Byzantine “Step Zero” disputes
about whether the agency action had the requisite level of formality – whether
it was reasonable to infer a delegation of lawmaking authority with respect to
J., dissenting). For a thoughtful exploration of what deference doctrine may look like
after Justice Scalia’s passing, see Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific
Chevron Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1097 (2016).
38. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (emphasis omitted).
39. See generally Kent Barnett and Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit
Courts,
115
MICH.
L.
REV
(forthcoming
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808848.
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a particular provision of a statute and the like – would simply disappear.40
(Of course, a universal application of deference would also simplify matters
just as much.)
Similarly, abolishing deference would erase complications about the
doctrine in Brand X, which holds that an agency interpretation of a statute
trumps a preexisting judicial interpretation, unless the preexisting judicial
decision found the statute to be clear.41 No longer would courts have to inquire whether a previous judicial interpretation – including pre-Chevron interpretations – concluded that its reading was the only permissible interpretation or merely the best among plausible options.42 Also gone would be the
most recent complexity piled atop Brand X, which now requires reviewing
courts also to decide whether that previous, contrary judicial opinion reached
a Step-Zero-style conclusion that Congress had “delegated gap-filling power
to the agency.”43
Abandoning Chevron might also purge collateral Step One litigation.
Courts and litigants would not have to address whether the set of interpretive
tools at Step One is coextensive with the tools courts use in de novo review,
or whether certain interpretive sources, canons, or methods should be jettisoned in that posture. The closer courts move to de novo review, the less
pressure on lurking questions about how hard courts ought to work before
deciding whether a statute is clear. Should Step One be “hard” in that courts
exert full effort to decide the question on their own before concluding the
statute, in fact, is unclear? Under such an approach, a court can resolve a
complex question of statutory interpretation for itself if it is certain the
sources point strongly toward one answer.44 On the other hand, a “soft” Step
One would withhold deference only if the statutory provision at issue were
obviously clear.45 As Lawson has explained, “[C]ourts seem blissfully unaware that there are [these] different conceptions of the nature of [S]tep [O]ne
from which they logically must be choosing.”46 In a world without Chevron,
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Beermann, supra note 6, at 823–29.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 984.
See id. at 1018 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844

(2012).
44. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160–61
(2000), superseded by statute, Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act,
21 U.S.C.A. §§ 387–387u (West 2016); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680,
706 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (no deference when the “disputed regulatory language is complex, but it is not ambiguous”).
45. See Pauley, 501 U.S. at 697 (deference appropriate when legislation “has
produced a complex and highly technical regulatory program”); Dole v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 43 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s
opinion today requires more than 10 pages, including a review of numerous statutory
provisions and legislative history, to conclude that the [Act] is clear and unambiguous
. . . .”).
46. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 672 (7th ed. 2016).
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we would just have our usual disputes about what a statute means, not the
meta-debate about what it means to decide whether the statute really, really
means something.
The common theme here is that second-order debates about statutory interpretation and implied delegation47 would disappear from administrative
law litigation. These meta-questions Chevron tees up are among the most
confounding for courts and litigators. They are also the most fascinating for
administrative law scholars who, like myself, swarm to such abstract, intricate puzzles like bees to honey – or moths to a flame.48 My research agenda
notwithstanding, dissolving those problems surely goes on the positive side of
the ledger.
But abolishing Chevron deference could also lead to complications.
One most commonly mentioned in administrative law scholarship is a potential decrease in uniform administration of statutes across the country. Regulatory uniformity is one of Chevron deference’s most celebrated benefits and
justifications.49 With deference, the EPA can decide what the Clean Air Act
means in all fifty states. Without it, critical provisions can mean different
things in states covered by, say, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. Absent Supreme Court intervention, the argument goes, regulatory chaos would reign.50
Yet such intervention would be unlikely, with the Supreme Court taking fewer cases every year.51 Given the contentious nature of statutory interpretation
debates and the complexity of regulatory statutes, non-deferential courts
would be more likely to confound the smooth administration of regulatory
regimes. That said, this oft-voiced worry may be overblown. It is unlikely
that more than two or three contested interpretations of any given statutory
provision would arise in the courts of appeals. Even without Supreme Court
intervention, the challenges agencies and regulated parties would face are not
much different than those that parties already confront when they operate in
multiple jurisdictions in the United States or around the globe. To note legal
pluralism’s costs is not the same as establishing that they are prohibitive.

47. This in itself implicates a different (third-order?) question of statutory interpretation under the shadow of constitutional law concerns about separation of powers.
48. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of
Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 799 (2010).
49. See, e.g., Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118–21 (1987) (the Chevron rule “enhances the probability of uniform national administration of the laws”).
50. On the other hand, as currently understood, Chevron can increase legal inconsistency over time. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (stating that “[a]gency inconsistency is not a basis
for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework”).
51. See generally, Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Discretionary
Dockets, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 221 (2016) (discussing the small number of cases the
Supreme Court accepts for review).
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The extent of additional disuniformity we would purchase by abandoning Chevron depends, again, on how much courts actually defer today. If
courts often approach statutes with an aggressive Step One, the disuniformity
we fear in theory is already here in practice. People may also differ on
whether this disuniformity is a feature or a bug. This uniformity question
sheds light on whether Chevron deference has a regulatory or deregulatory
bias.52 On its face, Chevron is neutral on this question, since an administration can receive just as much deference while dismantling a regulatory regime
as when constructing one. But to the extent deference increases uniformity,
one sees a slight pro-regulatory valence in the doctrine. Conflicting interpretations of organic statutes are sand in the gears of an expanding and smoothly
functioning regulatory regime. Irregularity frustrates the aspirations of central planners and the important repeat players in the regulatory community
who influence them. A deregulatory regime, by contrast, acts less and therefore does not have to defend its interpretations as often, particularly if it
simply ceases to enforce regulatory mandates. Notwithstanding cases like
Massachusetts v. EPA,53 reviewability doctrines often insulate agency inaction from judicial review.54 Accordingly, decentralizing and deregulatory
regimes are less likely to find themselves called to account for their interpretations than those that seek to expand the federal government’s reach.
In this respect, undoing deference may do more than create the small-c
conservative effect of slowing down centralized change in either a pro- or deregulatory direction. It may also have the large-c conservative effect of resisting centralization of power in the hands of a rationalized, imperial bureaucracy. Little surprise, then, that those who cheer federalism as a check on
national government are often the same people who would fret little over an
interpretive regime that gums up that national government’s administrative
apparatus. Now, it is not obvious that anyone should cheer for an interpretive
patchwork. For all we know, a misfiring, partially effective centralized bureaucracy, supplemented by judicial decision-making, may be the worst of all
possible worlds. Nevertheless, the prospect that abandoning interpretive def52. This question is different than Hamburger’s charge that Chevron systematically biases adjudication in favor of agencies. See Hamburger, Chevron Bias, supra
note 27, at 1211–13.
53. 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (forcing the EPA to decide whether to regulate greenhouse cases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act).
54. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (stating that denial of administrative enforcement is presumptively non-reviewable); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that review for
denial of petitions for rulemaking is very deferential). The elephant in the room here
is review of the Obama Administration’s decision to “defer prosecution” with respect
to categories of non-documented immigrants. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d
134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). Ironically, had the Obama Administration won in Texas, that victory could have given
subsequent administrations wider latitude to unravel congressionally mandated regulatory schemes favored by Obama’s political allies.
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erence would hamstring the rise of the administrative state is less likely to
worry recent Chevron critics on the political right. If you cannot “starve the
beast,” you can at least make it run uphill.55

V. DISAGGREGATING STEP TWO – AND “INTERPRETATION”
The biggest change that would come from abandoning Chevron, by definition, pertains to cases that proceed beyond Step One. Some of those cases
would turn out the same irrespective of Chevron deference, on the grounds
that the agency would lose at Step Two. Although there has been a slight
uptick in Step Two reversals at the Supreme Court,56 agencies usually win at
that stage, so it pays to ask how abandoning Chevron would affect those cases. Answering that question requires disaggregating Step Two questions in a
way that Chevron rejects, namely by distinguishing questions of law and policy. The re-entrenchment of this distinction would be the largest theoretical
change in judicial review of administrative action, but its immediate practical
effects are unclear. Either way, abandoning Chevron would dissolve
longstanding questions about Step Two.
To say Chevron’s Step Two is undertheorized slights excellent work
about the question.57 Yet important questions remain open, particularly regarding the relationship between Step Two and arbitrary-and-capricious review. Part of Chevron’s justification is that resolving statutory uncertainty
implicates policy choices.58 Because agencies are comparatively more expert
and politically accountable than courts, the argument goes, courts should
allow agencies to select among the reasonable interpretations.59 At the same
time, the standard for judicial review of agency policymaking is the arbitrary55. See Bruce Bartlett, “Starve the Beast”: Origins and Development of a Budgetary Metaphor, 12 INDEP. REV. 5 (2007).
56. See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532–35. Justice Scalia’s aggressive
review of the EPA’s interpretation in UARG v. EPA avoids the two-step framework,
simply finding the agency’s interpretation unreasonable. See Richard M. Re, What
Happened to Chevron Step One?, RE’S JUDICATA (June 23, 2014, 11:21 PM),
https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/06/23/what-happened-to-chevron-stepone (describing UARG’s elision of the two-step framework). For present purposes,
UARG’s holding is akin to a Step Two rejection of the agency’s interpretation.
57. See Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion, supra note 33;
Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process, supra note 14; Ronald M. Levin, The
Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997);
Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605 (2014); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretation of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994).
58. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–
66 (1984) (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision . . .
centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy . . . the challenge must fail.”).
59. See id.; Criddle, supra note 31, at 1286 (“Administrative agencies’ superior
experience and expertise in particular regulatory fields offers a . . . justification for
Chevron deference.”).
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and-capricious review the Court adopted in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.60 Under
this standard, courts consider the adequacy and rationality of the agency’s
decision-making process, not just the reasonableness of its policy choice.61
Chevron concerns statutory interpretation, and State Farm concerns
agency policymaking, but respect for agency policymaking justifies Chevron
deference toward agency interpretations.62 Unsurprisingly, then, courts discuss the “overlap” between the two standards of review.63 For this reason,
commentators have argued that an agency at Chevron Step Two should have
to do more than pick among the menu of reasonable interpretative choices.64
Just as in arbitrary-and-capricious review, an agency must also give a reason
connecting its chosen interpretation with the statute’s underlying purposes
and policies.65 Under traditional Chevron theory, this makes sense – deference to politically accountable experts loses its luster if agencies choose between reasonable interpretations by throwing darts or awarding the highest
bidder. Given general disagreement about what counts as a good statutory
argument, however, superimposing a reasoned decision-making requirement
on Step Two may be a recipe for further confusion.66
Getting rid of Chevron, however, would pull apart the overlap between
review of interpretation and policymaking. We can think of two (arguably)
different types of questions covered by Step Two under current doctrine.
First, there are questions of statutory interpretation that, from the perspective
of traditional lawyerly argument, are unclear: arguments from statutory text,
structure, interpretive canons, background purpose, legislative history, and
the like have purchase on the interpretive question but do not clearly point in
one direction. Multiple conclusions based on these arguments are reasonable,
even if a given interpreter thinks one is stronger than the other. Second, there
are questions where standard lawyerly argument does not get you far, if anywhere at all. Think of the statute in State Farm, which instructed regulators
to adopt safety standards that are “reasonable, practicable and appropriate.”67
60.
61.
62.
63.

463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983).
See id. at 41–43 (laying out criteria).
Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840, with id. at 41–43.
See, e.g., Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“We recognize
that, in some respects, Chevron review and arbitrary and capricious review overlap at
the margins.”).
64. See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 57; Levin, supra note 57.
65. See Seidenfeld, supra note 57, at 129.
66. See Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion, supra note 33, at
1384 (“Perhaps it would be good for the legal system to bring these issues out into the
open. Maybe we need some explicit judicial articulation of the rules of evidence for
proving statutory meaning. Then again, considering the likely outcome of such a
process, maybe the whole matter is best left buried, and . . . I should just shut up
about Chevron.”).
67. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 33 (1983) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(3) (repealed 1994)).
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Identifying and applying those legal standards will turn on facts about the
world, non-legal, technical expertise, and judgments about policy priorities
and likely outcomes.
In part because Chevron elides law and policy,68 these two kinds of
questions often march together under the banner of “interpretation” in administrative law.69 Abolishing Chevron would reestablish and put pressure on
this distinction. Courts would independently resolve the first type of “interpretive” questions by deciding which of the plausible options was strongest
on the legal merits, just like they do in other kinds of traditional hard cases.70
The second type of “interpretive” questions would (rightly) no longer be interpretive at all – courts would treat them as questions of policy judgment
subject to standard arbitrary-and-capricious review.
Recognizing this distinction in practice would not be as jarring for
courts as the Chevron literature suggests. Reviewing courts continue to apply
something like the distinction outside of Chevron. Take the tests appellate
courts use to identify whether an agency’s interpretive rule is an invalidly
promulgated substantive legislative rule. Like a disaggregated Step Two, that
distinction “turns on how tightly the agency’s interpretation is drawn linguistically from the actual language of the statute.”71 If there is too large a linguistic leap from the “interpreted” text to the rule itself, a reviewing court
68. See Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron – The Intersection of Law and Policy,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 823 (1990) (stating that the choice between “two or
more plausible interpretations . . . implicates and sometimes squarely involves policymaking”).
69. See Kozel & Pojanowski, Administrative Change, supra note 18, at 141–43
(identifying this distinction as one between “expository reasoning” and “prescriptive
reasoning,” respectively).
70. To be sure, some informal type of deference would creep in, as a court would
likely give weight to considered judgment of an agency with long experience and
close involvement with the statute. The agency here would be a persuasive, epistemic
authority – an optional source of good advice. Under Chevron, however, the agency
has legal authority over uncertain questions of interpretation: their opinions become
law simply because they say so, not because the court perceives them as one (of perhaps many) sources of insight. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
71. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
abrogated on other grounds by Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199
(2015)); see also Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 588 (“If the statute or rule to be
interpreted is itself very general, using terms like ‘equitable’ or ‘fair,’ and the ‘interpretation’ really provides all the guidance, then the latter will more likely be a substantive regulation.”); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir.
1996) (distinguishing between “what might be called normal or routine interpretation”
and making “rules that are consistent with the statute or regulation under which the
rules are promulgated but not derived from it, because they represent an arbitrary
choice among methods of implementation”).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 12

1088

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

will find that the agency made law rather than interpreted it.72 Administrative
law also recognizes a similar distinction when separating interpretive rules
from policy statements, which are non-binding announcements about how the
agency will exercise its enforcement discretion.73 This distinction between
interpretation and policymaking is not always crisp, and courts applying it in
the context of interpretive rules often note underlying tension with Chevron’s
collapse of these categories.74 Abandoning Chevron, then, would expand the
domain of questions where courts have to patrol this line.
The extent to which abolishing Chevron would change judicial review
therefore depends on how many Step Two cases are closer to (truly) interpretive questions. If courts take a soft approach to Chevron and defer at early
signs of complexity, the universe of actual interpretive questions beyond Step
One expands, as does the impact of abandoning Chevron. But if, as noted
above, courts are often aggressive in using the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation at Step One, there will be few cases in which courts cede core
lawyers’ disputes to the agencies. In fact, the high win rate for agencies at
Step Two is consistent with a strong Step One today.75 If courts leave interpretive questions to agencies only when the law is truly silent – as opposed to
contested – a Step Two victory is practically baked in once we get beyond
Step One. Accordingly, we should not be surprised to see those courts checking the Step Two box and swiftly moving on to arbitrary-and-capricious analysis, since such cases are really about reasonable policymaking, not reasoned
legal interpretation.76
72. See, e.g., Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no way an interpretation of ‘reasonable costs’ can produce the
sort of detailed – and rigid – investment code set forth in § 2162.2.A.4.”); see generally Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (1993)
(providing test for identifying cases where agency action entails lawmaking rather
than interpretation).
73. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like – Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41
DUKE L.J. 1311, 1326–27 (1992) (“If the document goes beyond a fair interpretation
of existing legislation, it is not an interpretive rule. Because it was not promulgated
legislatively, it cannot be a legislative rule; it therefore is a policy statement.”).
74. See Catholic Health Initiatives, 617 F.3d at 494 n.4 (noting that the EPA
regulations at issue in Chevron “interpreted the term ‘stationary source’ in the Clean
Air Act (and did a good deal more)”).
75. Cf. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 838 n.26 (2006)
(“More than 90 percent of invalidations under Chevron occurred under Step One.”). I
say only “consistent” because parties are also less likely to challenge plainly reasonable agency interpretations of unclear statutes. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (arguing that it is
error to assume litigated cases are representative of disputes settled before litigation).
76. Cf. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712–13 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In reality[,] . . . agencies ‘interpreting’ ambiguous statutes typically are not
engaged in acts of interpretation at all.”); Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and
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To continue the theme identified in Part IV, abolishing Chevron might
take relatively few statutory interpretations away from agencies, at least
judged by a baseline of aggressive statutory interpretation by courts. Again, a
world without Chevron could look a lot like Chevron as applied by Justice
Scalia, who often took away at Step One (or Two) what he gave to the doctrine at Step Zero.77 The segment of Step Two cases that are policy questions
cloaked in interpretive garb would go to State Farm analysis as they usually
do anyway, but without a pro forma run through the interpretive wringer. In
this light, dissolving confusion about Step Two without an appreciable difference in outcomes may be another benefit of abandoning Chevron. Those
whose skepticism of Chevron is rooted in distrust of administrative power
and not Ockham’s razor might be disappointed in the muted practical effects
of this doctrinal change.78 Yet the practical alignment of a post-Chevron
universe with our own would reflect the extent to which courts are already
exercising their judicial duty to say what the law is.79
Whatever the practical effects, this expanded judicial role would be a
significant change at the level of administrative legal theory, where the received wisdom rejects that interpretation/policymaking distinction as incoherent or at least judicially unmanageable.80 It would be a triumph of classical, pre-legal realist thought that, while aware of the blurriness in the lines
Discretion, supra note 33, at 1382 (arguing that “step two and traditional arbitrary or
capricious review therefore merge only when there is a ‘false Chevron’ issue: that is,
where at first glance the statute seems to say something meaningful about the problem, but on further inquiry, the problem turns out to be one of pure policymaking”).
77. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 75, at 826 (finding that “Justice Scalia, the
Court’s most vocal Chevron enthusiast, is the least deferential”).
78. A more aggressive approach would strike down on nondelegation grounds
statutory provisions that give little more than vague standards for administrative discretion. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that
giving “‘force of law’ to agency pronouncements on matters . . . as to which ‘Congress did not actually have an intent,’ . . . permit[s] a body other than Congress to
perform a function that requires an exercise of the legislative power” (quoting Dep’t
of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1251–52 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring))); Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 676, 686 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (finding a “standardless delegation” unconstitutional).
79. And not merely in the attenuated sense that the law says Congress “intends”
courts to defer to agencies. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative
State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983) (offering this thinner legalist justification for deference).
80. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 68, at 823 (Chevron is premised on the collapse of the distinction); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power
to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2583 (2006) (arguing that Chevron, like
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, represents “an institutional shift in interpretive power
brought about by a realistic understanding of what interpretation involves”); cf. John
F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 924 (2004) (“In view
of the intellectual developments associated with [Chevron], . . . the present framework
for distinguishing interpretative from legislative rules reduces to an unmanageable
question of degree.”).
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between making, executing, and interpreting law, nevertheless insists that the
division of these activities was coherent in theory and estimable in practice.
The great administrative legal theorist John Dickinson would concur with
Hamburger that today’s calls for de novo review of agency decisions echoes
Lord Coke’s bid to place the Crown under the supremacy of law.81 Dickinson also argued, however, that this doctrine of the supremacy of law relies on
notions of legal custom, reason, and even “the transcendental” that can appear
“foreign” to today’s more realist and functionalist patterns of legal thought.82
It is therefore no wonder that Hamburger, one of today’s leading critics of
administrative power, also wrote an extended historical meditation on judicial
duty, one which excludes the will from legal judgment and “segregate[s] judicial duty from lawmaking power.”83
Relatedly, and more speculatively, patrolling the distinction between interpretation and policymaking may presuppose and further bolster more formal approaches to legal interpretation. The more dynamic and pragmatic
one’s approach to statutory interpretation, the more interpretive problems
resemble the policy questions a post-Chevron framework would steer toward
arbitrary-and-capricious review. Put another way, the distinction between
interpretation and policymaking presupposes substantial autonomy of legal
text and method from policy choices. This premise may be correct, but it is
certainly not neutral in its understanding of what legal interpretation is. In
this respect, as in many others, Professor Thomas Merrill was prescient in
identifying a tension between sophisticated textualism and meaningful Chevron deference.84

VI. CONCLUSION
The Court is unlikely to overrule Chevron, at least directly.85 One lesson of this thought experiment, however, is that the practical stakes for abandoning Chevron may not be as high as advertised. The combination of aggressive Steps Zero and One, as well as the growing recognition that many
81. See JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 75, 76–104 (1927) (tracing the English historical roots of
“the demand that the determination of rights should in the last analysis be a matter for
the courts”).
82. Id. at 84; see also id. at 84 n.23 (quoting Justice Holmes’s skepticism of law
as “brooding omnipresence in the sky” in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 222 (1917)).
83. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 609 (2008).
84. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
85. The Supreme Court’s recent refusal to consider the even-more-beleaguered
doctrine of Auer deference to agencies’ interpretation of their own regulations might
further indicate that reconsideration of Chevron is quite unlikely. See United Student
Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari).
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Step Two cases are not really about interpretation, suggest that the challenge
Chevron presents to the judiciary’s power to say what the law is today is not
as woeful as the doctrine’s detractors imagine. Nor is Chevron, so domesticated, as revolutionary as some of its champions hope. The shift from deference to de novo may be a marginal one measured against the actual amount of
interpretive deference occurring today.
That does not mean the question of abandoning Chevron is idle. Most
of the withheld deference that critics hope for and that champions bemoan
comes with the cost of confusing and time-consuming satellite litigation
about Chevron’s domain, structure, and strength.86 Even if the current regime
gets us roughly the right amount of (non-)deference, going straight to de novo
review sheds this doctrinal deadweight loss. Furthermore, even if (and it is a
big “if”) courts are already blunting Chevron’s force through domesticating
doctrine, there is no guarantee that it will always stay that way. So much of
the domestication comes from practices that are rarely litigated or even litigate-able, such as the intensity of Step One review.87 Accordingly, the Chevron law on the ground could shift underneath our feet toward deference with
hardly a judicial pronouncement. An explicit judicial embrace of de novo
review on questions of law might be a brace against such tectonic realignment.
Other potential changes illuminate the politics of administrative law.
Much of the recent criticism of Chevron deference comes from the jurisprudential “right,” for lack of a better term.88 One easy explanation for this development could be conservative frustration with eight years of a Democratic
administration, contrasted with enthusiasm for the doctrine at its outset in the
Reagan years.89 A more complete explanation, however, looks deeper. As
86. See Beermann, supra note 6, at 785 (finding “cases may become more complicated to litigate and decide. This would lead to increased costs and might give
some litigants more hope of prevailing then they might otherwise have had, which
would encourage litigation”).
87. Courts often also ignore Step Zero questions. See, e.g., Sunstein, Chevron
Step Zero, supra note 16, at 208 (claiming that various courts have failed to give
consideration to Step Zero). Consider the Court’s opinion in Texas Department of
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., which affirmed
an agency’s claim that the Fair Housing Act allows disparate-impact claims. 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2525–26 (2015). The Court did not rely on Chevron, even though that
framework had been used previously. Compare id., with Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S.
280, 287–88 (2013) (“[T]he Department of Housing and Urban Development . . . has
specified that ordinary vicarious liability rules apply in this area. And we ordinarily
defer to an administering agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute.”). Neither
dissent mentioned Chevron. See Tex. Dep’t of Housing & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at
2526–2551.
88. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 75, at 823 (“On the Supreme Court, conservative justices vote to validate agency decisions less often then liberal justices.”).
89. And, in turn, one could point out that early resistance to Chevron did not
come from the right, while some of its most strident defenders today support the current administration’s regulatory agenda. See id. (“[T]he most conservative members
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discussed above, abandoning deference may interrupt the smooth working of
the administrative state by introducing conflicting interpretations of regulatory statutes. Further, interpretation after Chevron points toward a classical
vision of the separation of powers, the autonomy of legal reasoning, and a
more formalist approach to reading law.90 These concomitant pressures toward decentralized, checked government – paired with an understanding of
judicial role that is craft-oriented, restrained, and yet non-delegable – resound
with a classical conservative vision that champions locally ordered liberty
and fears a homogenizing, leveling bureaucracy. Whether in the form offered
by James Madison, Edmund Burke, Russell Kirk, or even Friedrich Hayek,
such a vision of law and the state confounds at nearly every point the plans of
New Deal architects like James Landis.91
This relationship between conservative political thought and Chevron
skepticism also helps explain defenses of deference by thinkers associated
with the jurisprudential right. Although classical common lawyers and contemporary thinkers like Hamburger may see wisdom, reason, and workable
determinacy in the exercise of the judicial duty, other conservatives see uncertainty that opens the way to inept governance or judicial usurpation of
politics.92 In fact, textualism rose among legal conservatives in part from
doubt about the autonomy, knowability, and determinacy of law in challenging cases – a moderate legal realist skepticism reinforced by the disenchant-

of the Supreme Court show significantly increased validation of agency interpretations after President Bush succeeded President Clinton, and the least conservative
members of the court show significantly decreased validation rates in the same period. In a similar vein, the most conservative members of the Court are less likely to
validate liberal agency interpretations than conservative ones, and the least conservative members of the Court show the opposite pattern.”).
90. One could argue that deference is consistent with the court’s duty to say what
the law is if the law, in fact, tells the judge to defer. See Monaghan, supra note 79, at
27–28. On my dissatisfaction with that (ingenious) explanation, see Jeffrey Pojanowski, A Socratic Dialogue Inspired by “Marbury and the Administrative State,”
J.
ON
REG.:
NOTICE
&
COMMENT
(May
26,
2016),
YALE
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/a-socratic-dialogue-inspired-by-marbury-and-theadministrative-state-by.
91. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); Carl T. Bogus, Rescuing Burke, 72 MO. L. REV. 387, 390 (2007) (“Burke believed in what eighteenth century British statesmen called ‘mixed government’ and we today call ‘separation of
powers.’ Thus, Burke . . . opposed too much power residing in one branch of government . . . .”), with JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 2 (1938)
(“The insistence upon the compartmentalization of power along triadic lines gave way
in the nineteenth century to the exigencies of governance.”).
92. Compare, e.g., HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 27, with ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION (2006).
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ing teachings of public choice theory.93 For Professor Hamburger, Coke; for
Professor Manning, Radin.94 Legal conservatism is a They, not an It.95
In this respect, the late Justice Scalia is a central figure who contains
multitudes.96 In embracing the skeptical case for textualism, he helped underwrite the argument for deference to politically accountable policymakers
in hard cases.97 In his confidence that the law’s artificial reason would in fact
be a true guide in many challenging cases, he acted in defiance of the nostrum
that hard cases turn on politics.98 He left with his deference jurisprudence in
suspension, and the question remains whether – or how – the Court will resolve the chord.

93. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287,
1290–98 (2010) (describing the relationship between public-choice theory and the rise
of textualism).
94. See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 27; John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2410 n.81 (2004) (tracing textualists’ skepticism about legislative intent back to legal realist thinker Max Radin). For a critique
of the turn to classicism in administrative law, see Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT.
REV. 41.
95. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECONS. 239 (1992).
96. See WALT WHITMAN, SONG OF MYSELF (1892) (“I am large, I contain multitudes.”).
97. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 38, at 521 (“I tend to think, however, that in the
long run Chevron will endure and be given its full scope . . . because it more accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more adequately serves its needs.”).
98. Justice Scalia’s account of adjudication in other contexts is emblematic of his
ambivalence. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it,
which is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it – discerning what the law is, rather
than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”) (emphasis
omitted).
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